OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps is not enough for SOC agents: add G8TED action governance
OWASP reduces LLM app vulnerabilities. G8TED governs what the agent is allowed to execute in the SOC when those vulnerabilities still happen.
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps is not enough for SOC agents: add G8TED action governance
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications is the right starting point if you are building or integrating LLM-powered tools. It helps you reduce common failure modes like injection, insecure output handling, and overly-permissioned agent behavior.
But if your LLM tool can take state-changing SOC actions, OWASP alone does not answer the question that incident reviews and auditors care about:
“If the model is wrong or manipulated, what stops it from breaking production or destroying evidence?”
That is an execution governance problem.
G8TED is the action execution governance layer for SOC agents and automation. It standardizes typed actions, outcomes (allow, require_approval, deny, shadow_only), Risk Reasons, and audit-grade Proof.
Related:
- Canonical explainer: /blog/g8ted-safe-soc-autonomy
- What G8TED is (and isn’t): /blog/what-is-g8ted
- G8TED Spec v1.0: /spec/v1.0
- Where G8TED fits in the stack: /blog/g8ted-in-ai-security-stack
The strategic point
OWASP reduces vulnerability likelihood. G8TED limits blast radius when vulnerabilities still happen.
If you are letting an LLM:
- disable accounts
- isolate hosts
- purge or quarantine email
- revoke keys
- change firewall rules
then you need explicit action-level gates.
Why OWASP alone does not solve “safe execution”
OWASP guidance is primarily about building a safer LLM application.
It does not, by itself, define:
- which SOC actions are allowed to execute automatically
- which actions require approval
- which actions are forbidden
- what evidence must be recorded to defend the decision after the fact
Those questions are exactly what an action governance layer exists to answer.
OWASP to G8TED: the “what if OWASP fails anyway?” map
Use this table as a practical mental model. OWASP reduces these risks. G8TED governs the outcome when the system is still exposed or gets bypassed.
| If this happens in your LLM app | What you should assume | The G8TED guardrail to add |
|---|---|---|
| Prompt injection succeeds | The action proposal may be attacker-controlled | Trigger Risk Reason automation_input_tampering and default to deny for high-impact actions |
| Insecure output handling exists | Tool calls can be coerced or malformed | Enforce typed actions + strict schema validation; require shadow_only on schema violations |
| Excessive agency / overbroad tools | The agent can do too much, too fast | Constrain allowed typed actions and scope; apply tool_scope_mismatch to force require_approval |
| Weak attribution / poor identity binding | You may act on the wrong target | Apply weak_attribution to require approval or shadow-only until evidence is complete |
| Missing evidence or weak logging | You cannot defend the decision later | Apply incomplete_evidence to force shadow_only and require Minimum Proof fields |
| Legal hold and retention constraints | Some actions may be non-compliant | Apply compliance_or_legal_hold to deny (or require explicit exception policy) |
| The model is uncertain or inconsistent | The “why” cannot be defended | Apply safety_model_uncertainty to shadow_only |
This is the core difference:
- OWASP is about preventing the conditions.
- G8TED is about governing execution under uncertainty and adversarial pressure.
A concrete pattern: “OWASP first, then G8TED”
Here is a sane implementation sequence:
Step 1: Harden the app (OWASP intent)
- Reduce injection paths
- Lock down tool invocation interfaces
- Validate outputs before tool calls
- Remove unnecessary tool permissions
Step 2: Add action governance (G8TED)
- Define typed actions for your SOC state changes
- Set default outcomes by action type and risk tier
- Add Risk Reason overrides for blast radius, Tier0/VIP, evidence gaps, input integrity
- Require Minimum Proof fields per outcome
Step 3: Run it in Shadow first
Before you allow automation to execute, force:
- evaluation only
- Proof recording
- zero execution
Then roll out by risk tier.
What to implement if you only do three things
If your LLM touches real systems, start with these three rules:
- If evidence is incomplete, do not execute
Risk Reason:incomplete_evidence
Outcome:shadow_only - If blast radius is high or Tier0/VIP is involved, require approval
Risk Reasons:high_blast_radius,tier0_or_vip_impact
Outcome:require_approval - If input integrity is suspect, deny
Risk Reason:automation_input_tampering
Outcome:deny - This combination is the shortest path to “safer than the average agentic SOC deployment.”
FAQ
Do I still need OWASP if I use G8TED?
Yes. OWASP reduces the likelihood of LLM application vulnerabilities. G8TED governs runtime execution when vulnerabilities still exist or are bypassed.
Does OWASP cover approvals and audit-grade Proof for SOC actions?
Not as an action-level execution standard. You still need explicit outcomes, guardrails, and Proof requirements for state-changing actions.
What is the fastest way to adopt G8TED?
Start with Shadow mode, record Proof, and roll out by risk tier. Keep high blast radius and Tier0/VIP actions gated behind explicit approval.
Changelog
- 2025-12-16: Initial post published.
Implementation note for Rocky: If you are already injecting FAQ JSON-LD based on frontmatter, add a faq block to this post too.